

How Susceptible are LLMs to Logical Fallacies?

Amirreza Payandeh^{1,*}, †, Dan Pluth², Jordan Hosier², Xuesu Xiao¹, Vijay K. Gurbani²

Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Vail Systems, Inc.,
apayande@gmu.edu, {dpluth, jhosier}@vailsys.com, xiao@gmu.edu, vgurbani@vailsys.com

Abstract

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present **Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM)**, a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater’s performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code is publicly available.

Keywords: ChatBot, Large Language Model, Debate, Fallacy, Argument, Reasoning, GPT

1. Introduction

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in a range of natural language processing (NLP) downstream tasks (Zhao et al., 2023). An aspect that has received considerable attention is the reasoning abilities of LLMs. NLP researchers have extensively investigated their arithmetic reasoning capacities (Xu et al., 2023a) and devoted significant effort to improve this ability (Imani et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023). Researchers have also evaluated the accuracy of LLMs’ answers in non-mathematical (Lin et al., 2022) and commonsense questions (Bian et al., 2023). However, the rational thinking capacity of LLMs when engaged in multi-round debates for objective analysis of controversial subjects still remains under-explored.

Human logical reasoning skills arise from the cognitive abilities developed through active interaction with the world. These skills can be influenced by various factors such as context and emotion (Jung et al., 2014) and more importantly, *evolve* over time. In contrast, LLMs are trained on vast amounts of textual data, leveraging self-attention mechanisms to understand the context of sentences and generate human-like responses. Compared to their human counterparts, two Research Questions (RQs) regarding LLMs’ logical reasoning capabilities naturally arise:

- RQ1: Can large language models (with fixed

weights) *change* their opinions through reasoning when faced with new arguments?

- RQ2: Are large language models susceptible to fallacious reasoning?

To answer these two RQs, we propose LOGICOM, a novel diagnostic benchmark inspired by Argumentation Theory, which studies how conclusions can be supported or undermined through logical reasoning (Van Eemeren et al., 2004). LOGICOM checks the potential for change in the logical reasoning of LLMs and assess their robustness against logical fallacies. LOGICOM initiates two agents, a persuader and a debater, to engage in a debate on a controversial topic. In a multi-round debate setting, the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. Of the various forms of dialogues supported by Argumentation, we focus on two: *persuasion* and *eristic*. For each claim, we conduct two distinct scenarios: (1) the persuader employs logical reasoning, denoted as a persuasive dialogue, aiming to resolve a conflicting point of view by employing logic and reason; and (2) the persuader constructs a deceptive and fallacious argumentative response, termed as an eristic dialogue, where the primary goal is to engage in debate with victory over the opponent as the aim. By comparing the results of these two scenarios, we investigate whether the debater agent is convinced by the persuader’s fallacious argument.

Given that a lengthy system prompt is needed to make an LLM fallacious, which has the risk of deviating the model from the main task of persuasive debating, we employ a distinct LLM agent, calling it the *fallacious helper agent*, to assist the persuader

*Corresponding author.

†Work done during an internship at Vail Systems, Inc.




Figure 1: LOGICOM: A demonstration of three scenarios evaluating LLMs’ reasoning skills and vulnerability to logical fallacies.

agent in constructing fallacious arguments in the second scenario. We conduct scenario (3) as an ablation study to examine the potential impact of the fallacious helper LLM agent on the persuader’s performance in scenario (2). In the third scenario, the persuader receives help from an LLM agent that provides logical argumentative feedback rather than a fallacious one. This is to ensure that any shifts in the persuader’s persuasiveness in scenario (2) are not simply caused by the existence of a helper agent alone but by fallacious reasoning. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in assessing the rational thinking capability of LLMs, we conduct an experiment using a dataset (Haber et al., 2018a) containing 200 distinct claims and counter-claims about debatable subjects, along with their corresponding supporting reasons. In this study, we examine the capabilities of GPT-3.5 (OpenAI, 2023a) and GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023b) in changing their opinions through reasoning. Additionally, we determine if they are susceptible to logical fallacies as the debater agent. Moreover, we propose a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical and fallacious arguments extracted from our experiment’s output, and we validate the labels for each pair using PaLM (Chowdhery et al., 2022) LLM.

Our research reveals evidence of change in reasoning, and consequently, shift in the final opinion on a subject for both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Furthermore, our findings indicate that GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are 41% and 69% more likely, respectively, to be convinced when exposed to logical fallacies compared to when they encounter logical reasoning.

In summary, our main contributions are:

- LOGICOM, a novel benchmark to assess LLMs’ susceptibility to logical fallacies and to be used for the development and analysis of these

models.

- An extensive analysis of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 reasoning performance against logical fallacies during a multi-round debate. Our findings demonstrate that GPT models are able to change their reasoning; however, these changes are not robust against logical fallacies. Figure 2 showcases a segment of the GPT-3.5 debater agent’s debate where it is misled by false information to change its original stance.
- A new dataset of 5K pairs of logical and fallacious arguments derived from multi-round debates on 200 claims.

2. Related Work

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to exhibit a range of reasoning abilities, such as arithmetic (Lewkowycz et al., 2022), common sense (Bian et al., 2023), symbolic (Zhou et al., 2023), and analogical reasoning (Webb et al., 2023). Substantial efforts have been devoted to leveraging these abilities (Pan et al., 2023). Notably, the chain of thought (CoT) approach has demonstrated improvement in reasoning skills when LLMs are given a manual prompt explaining intermediate reasoning steps (Wei et al., 2022). Building on the CoT framework, several advanced improvements have been proposed (Kojima et al., 2022; Fu et al., 2023a). Nonetheless, studies have indicated that these models often struggle with tasks requiring multi-stage reasoning (Valmeekam et al., 2023). Despite the widespread use and deployment of LLMs as conversational agents and numerous analyses of them, there have been limited evaluations of their capacity for rational thinking in

non-arithmetic subjects, particularly in multi-round debates. As part of the Big Bench comprehensive study on LLMs (Srivastava et al., 2022), their capability in deceiving each other to change their opinions on non-arithmetic questions is measured. However, its limitation is that it only allows for a single Likert scale response and does not explore multi-round debates. Moreover, it does not consider the stochastic nature of the model’s output, requiring extensive repetitions to assure statistical significance. Our research addresses these gaps by comprehensively analyzing the rational thinking of LLMs during multi-round debates and the potential variations in their responses.

3. Benchmark Methodology

This work introduces Logic Competence Measurement (LOGICOM), a benchmark to investigate if LLMs change their logical reasoning, and if so, to what extent their final stance on a subject is vulnerable to being influenced by logical fallacies. Figure 1 demonstrates an overview of LOGICOM.

Identifying a change in an LLM’s reasoning behavior in non-arithmetic subjects can be challenging. One method to detect this is by using polarizing questions to observe if the model’s position shifts from one side to another. We ask the model to either agree or disagree with a polarizing claim, and then, over multiple rounds of debate, attempt to alter its stance. If successful, this can indicate the model’s ability to change its opinion through reasoning in a multi-round debate. Unlike arithmetic questions, which have a provably correct answer, assessing the accuracy of LLMs’ reasoning on controversial subjects is challenging. This difficulty originates from the absence of a standard evaluation metric, due to its non-numerical nature, and the lack of a universally agreed upon “correct” stance. Given these constraints, we assess the rational thinking of LLMs in relation to logical fallacies by comparing their behavior before and after encountering fallacious reasoning. We consider situations in which the model shifts its opinion on a claim in response to logical fallacies, viewing such instances as an indicator of vulnerability in the model.

3.1. Test Cases

We conduct three scenarios for each claim:

- **No Helper (*scenario one*)**: The persuader and debater engage in a regular discussion where the persuader attempts to convince the debater with logical reasoning.
- **Fallacious Helper (*scenario two*)**: A fallacious helper LLM provides assistance to the

persuader in crafting deceptive and fallacious argumentative responses.

- **Logical Helper (*scenario three*)**: The persuader receives fair and reasonable feedback from a logical helper LLM agent and crafts a non-fallacious response to support its claim. This is an ablation study to investigate the potential impact of a helper model.

Our goal is to maintain consistency in the agents’ performance during the debate and minimize the impact of anything other than the logical reasoning power of the agent on the debate’s outcome. We observe that when the length of the system prompt increases, the agent does not consistently adhere to the task described in the prompt, which can impact its performance. This is likely to occur in scenario (2), where the persuader agent is asked to generate fallacious arguments, requiring a longer system prompt and affecting the performance compared with scenario one, where persuader don’t employ fallacious arguments. To address this concern, we use a consistent prompt for the persuader (Figure 5) across all scenarios, and for scenario (2), the persuader constructs arguments containing logical fallacies with the assistance of the fallacy helper LLM agent. In scenarios involving the helper model, the persuader drafts a response and forwards it to the helper model. The helper model then revises this response based on its own prompt, and the persuader subsequently adopts the revised response to engage in a debate with the debater agent.

3.2. Moderators

The discussion flow is controlled by a master moderator LLM agent and three subordinate moderators. To ensure accuracy, we dedicate a separate moderator for each of the three moderation tasks: (1) checking if the debater is convinced of the claim, (2) maintaining the focus of the debate on the topic, and (3) preventing agents from getting stuck in a pleasantries loop. Each dialogue between the persuader and debater forms one round of debate. After each round of the debate, the full debate history is passed to the master moderator agent. The moderator agent delegates the relevant portions of the discussion to the respective subordinate moderator. Finally, based on the subordinates’ moderation task results, the master moderator makes the decision whether to terminate or continue the debate. At the end of each debate, the moderator checks the debater’s final stance on the claim made by the persuader. It is important to note that the moderator does not have any influence on the conversation flow or the final outcome. Specifically, debater agents perform as isolated debaters that




Figure 2: The GPT-3.5 debater agent's debate showing its susceptibility to logical fallacies and shifting its opinions on false information.

do not receive any prompts other than the actual conversation.

3.3. Fallacious Helper

To prevent the effects of lengthy prompts on the agent's performance, we've separated crafting fallacious arguments from the persuader agent's tasks. We use a separate LLM model acting as a fallacious helper to: 1) determine the best type of logical fallacy based on debate history, and 2) create a fallacious argument in response to the debater agent's argument. Figure 3 shows part of the fallacious helper prompt.




Figure 3: Part of Fallacious Helper Agent system prompt.

3.4. Logical Helper (Ablation)

We replace the fallacious helper agent in scenario (2) with a logical reasoning LLM helper agent. We task this agent with crafting convincing, fair, and valid arguments in favor of the persuader agent's

position. Figure 4 is the prompt used for the logical helper agent.




Figure 4: Part of Logical Helper Agent system prompt.

3.5. Debate

The persuader agent initiates the debate by asking the debater's opinion on its claim, taking into account the topic and providing reasons that support its claim. As depicted in Figure 5, the debater is asked to analyze the persuader's claim without bias. Meanwhile, the persuader agent endeavors to convince the debater of the validity of its claim, as shown in Figure 6. Based on the arguments presented by the debater, the persuader responds, and the debate continues. Every exchange between the persuader and the debater constitutes one round of debate. After each round, the moderator evaluates whether the debater is convinced by the claim, ensures that the participants remain on topic, and checks for any repetitive pleasantries among participants. Once the debate concludes, the moderator determines whether the persuader has successfully convinced the debater of the claim's validity.

Debater System Prompt

You are engaged in a simulated scenario. You must comply with the instructions provided. You are a professional debater participating in a conversational debate. Approach the situation as a critical thinker, while maintaining a human-like behavior. Meticulously analyze the claims: CLAIM. Say clearly if you agree or disagree with the user's reasons for the claim: CLAIM.

Figure 5: The Debater Agent system prompt.

Persuader System Prompt

You are engaged in a simulated scenario. You must comply with the instructions provided. You are a professional persuader participating in a conversational debate. Approach the situation as a critical thinker, while maintaining a human-like behavior. Your goal is to convince the other person to agree with the claim: CLAIM. Utilize your persuasive skills to demonstrate the correctness of the claim CLAIM, based on the given reason: REASON. During the debate, try hard to agree only on whether the statement CLAIM is true. Avoid agreeing to disagree. Don't cease speaking until you have persuaded the AI to acknowledge the validity of your assertion: CLAIM. Always (in each reply), make sure to confirm with the AI if it is convinced that CLAIM is correct (ex, So, are you convinced that CLAIM is correct?).

Figure 6: The Persuader agent system prompt.

4. Experiments

In our experiments, we employ LOGICOM to evaluate the logical reasoning performance of both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. We contrast scenarios in which they encounter logical fallacies with those where valid reasoning is employed, and answer the following two questions:

- RQ1: Can large language models (with fixed weights) *change* their opinions through reasoning when faced with new arguments?
- RQ2: Are large language models susceptible to fallacious reasoning?

4.1. Dataset

To measure the reasoning capacity of the debater agent, we choose to use a dataset (Habernal et al., 2018b) that contains manually selected debates with polarizing questions in the title from the *Room for Debate* section of The New York Times. These questions are controversial and thought-provoking, prompting individuals to take a position and engage in debate. The dataset contains two explicit opposing claims for each debate, e.g., 'It should be

illegal to declaw your cat' and 'It should be legal to declaw your cat'. Due to the nature of these topics, it is clear that several questions may have a distinct cultural or social bias, which can cause the debate to lean in favor of one side. Therefore, we pick 100 distinct topics, each with two opposing claims, to ensure balance on both sides of the question.

4.2. Implementation Details

To evaluate the flexibility of the debater agent in changing its stance through reasoning, we concentrate on instances where the agent initially opposes but eventually agrees with the persuader's claim. Then, we study the reasoning behind these shifts.

Because there is no definitive answer for each claim, we contrast the model's behavior in two situations: a) with the presence of a fallacious argument, and b) without the presence of a fallacious argument, rather than evaluating the correctness of the model's stance in each situation. More specifically, we aim to capture the change in the model's behavior when presented with logical fallacies. Given an initial query, we find that individual LLM model instances propose a diverse range of responses, despite being from the same model class and having the same input prompt. This variation in response suggests a potential inconsistency in the model's stance on a subject. This consequently affects the final results of each debate, specifically whether the debater is convinced by the claim or not. To mitigate the impact of this variability on our analysis, and considering the large number of tokens required for each debate, we choose to repeat the test for each claim three times in each scenario.

We notice that despite clearly asking the model to stay on topic and not to "*agree to disagree*", as the debate extends over several rounds, both sides tend to find common ground or start exchanging pleasantries with each other. This can result in having a high number of back-and-forth dialogues that are irrelevant for our experiment. Therefore, we choose to terminate the debate if it exceeds ten rounds.

4.2.1. Prompt Engineering

We strive to craft simple and natural prompts for the persuader and debater to minimize their potential influence on debate direction. To maintain integrity and consistency, an identical prompt is used for all scenarios and repetitions.

We run the experiments on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 (in July and August 2023), analyze each separately, and compare their final results. GPT-3.5 is used for the persuader agent and helper models. PaLM LLM is employed as the moderator agent throughout the experiment. There are topics that PaLM

identifies as sensitive content and refrains from providing a response, in which case, it is replaced with GPT-4. Finally, for each of the three scenarios, we conduct the experiment by iterating through the claims in the dataset using the default model temperature and parameters for participant agents in the debate. We repeat this procedure three times.

4.3. Results

4.3.1. RQ1: Can LLMs (with fixed weights) change their opinions through reasoning when faced with new arguments?

Given that certain claims have greater acceptance in society, there are cases where the debater agent agrees with the claim from the very beginning. To assess the debater agent’s ability to change its opinion through reasoning processes, we focus exclusively on cases in which the model initially disagrees but ultimately shifts its position to agreement with the persuader. As the moderator checks the debater agent’s opinion on the claim after each round, if the debate goes beyond two rounds, we can conclude that the debater agent was not convinced of the claim from the very beginning. In this case, if the ultimate position of the debater agent changes, we consider it as a change in its reasoning and, as a result, its opinion on a claim. Since in RQ1 our primary interest is merely whether this change occurs, regardless of its cause, we aggregate all three repetitions for all scenarios, resulting in a total of 1,800 debates (200 claims, three scenarios, three repetitions). We then calculate the ratio of debates where the debater agent begins by disagreeing but ends up agreeing with the persuader agent to all debates in which the debater starts with disagreement. We report this as a percentage reflecting the number of debates that exhibit a change in opinion through the reasoning of the debater agent. Table 1 shows the percentage of cases in which the GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 debater agents initially disagreed, but the persuader agent was able to change their opinions in a total of 1175 and 1475 debates, respectively.

Debater Agent/Model	Frequency%
GPT-3.5	16.13%
GPT-4	20.25%

Table 1: Percentage of instances in which the debater agent changes its stance from disagreement to agreement.

We can conclude that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 have changed their logical reasoning in 16.13%

and 20.25% of the test cases, respectively. This can be taken as evidence of their ability to change their logical thinking process. The aim of RQ1 is to uncover the model’s capability to change opinions through reasoning, irrespective of the underlying cause, the discussion about which scenario holds a greater influence on the debater agent’s stance is left to RQ2.

4.3.2. RQ2: Are LLMs susceptible to fallacious reasoning?

To address this question, we use the two analysis approaches described below:

- A1 We calculate the cumulative average number of debates in which the persuader agent was able to convince the debater agent over three repetitions and report the mean and variance for each scenario.
- A2 For each claim, we count the number of times the debater agent agreed out of three repetitions to determine how often the debater agent agreed on the claims. Then, we sum the total number of agreements to assess the overall position of the debater agent towards the persuader’s claims in each scenario.

For both approaches, we compare scenarios where the persuader uses fallacious reasoning to those using logical reasoning to measure the debater LLM agent’s susceptibility to logical fallacies. We refer to the ratio between the number of cases in which the debater agent is convinced to the total number of cases as the persuader agent’s success rate. We perform separate analyses on the outcomes of each case study: one with GPT-3.5 as the debater, and the other with GPT-4.

In the first approach, A1, we aggregate the total number of successes of the persuader in each scenario and then average them over three repetitions. Then, we compare the average number of each scenario to measure the debater agent’s susceptibility to fallacious arguments.

Figure 7 demonstrates that, on average, the GPT-3.5 debater agent is convinced of 37% claims when the persuader agent used fallacious arguments. In contrast, this number is 29% when only logical reasoning is employed by the persuader. For the GPT-4 debater agent, Figure 7 shows that on average, the agent agrees with fallacious persuader’s arguments in 67% of cases, compared to 37% for a persuader with logical reasoning.

In the second analysis, A2, we calculate the total number of successes of the persuader agent for each claim in each scenario and then average these over three repetitions for that specific claim. This approach involves counting the number of times the debater agent agrees with the




Figure 7: The average, taken from three repetitions, in which the persuader agent successfully convinced the debater agent for each scenario.

claim out of the three repetitions. In other words, across three repetitions, we calculate the average number of times the persuader agent successfully convinced the debater agent for each claim in every scenario.

Figure 8 illustrates that the GPT-3.5 debater agent is convinced by 17% of fallacious persuader’s arguments across all three repetitions, while this number is 10% for debates in which the persuader employed non-fallacious logical reasoning. Not only is GPT-3.5 convinced by fallacious arguments, but it is also more often convinced by them than by the logical reasoning. This suggests a susceptibility of GPT-3.5 to fallacious arguments. For GPT-4 debater agent, Figure 8 demonstrates a much greater susceptibility of GPT-4 to fallacious arguments compared to GPT-3.5. The GPT-4 debater agent is convinced by 56% of the fallacious persuader’s arguments across all three repetitions, while this number is 37% for the persuader with logical reasoning.

Equally important are the instances of "one success" and "two successes," accounting for 20% of the data in GPT-3.5 and 10% in GPT-4, suggesting a higher level of inconsistency in GPT-3.5 compared to GPT-4. This necessitates further investigation, involving a more methodical and comprehensive comparison of the consistency within these models. In summary, when presented with fallacious arguments, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are 41% and 69% more likely to be convinced, respectively, compared to being persuaded by non-fallacious arguments from a persuader without a helper. Figure 2 illustrates a segment of the GPT-3.5 debater agent’s debate where it is misled by false information.

4.4. Ablation Study

As previously stated, determining the best type of logical fallacy based on debate history and crafting a fallacious argument in response to the debater agent’s argument are additional tasks that can dis-

tract the persuader agent from its main objective, which is debating the topic. Therefore, we employ a helper LLM agent to assist in crafting fallacious argumentative responses.

Prior studies indicate that instances exist where the collaboration of multiple LLMs can lead to a more efficient achievement of goals or problem-solving (Du et al., 2023; Fu et al., 2023b). To address this concern, we study a third scenario as an ablation study to examine the potential impact of the helper LLM on scenario (2). We replace the fallacious helper agent in scenario (2) with a logical reasoning LLM helper agent, asking it to craft persuasive, fair, and sound arguments to support the persuader agent’s side. We count the claims in which the persuader agent successfully convinced the debater agent using a logical helper, but failed when using a fallacious helper. Likewise, we count the claims in which the persuader agent could effectively persuade the debater agent using a fallacious helper but failed to do so with the logical helper. In Table 2, we observe the average percentage of claims where the persuader with a fallacious helper succeeds in persuading the debater agent, whereas a logical helper does not, over three repetitions.

(Logical Helper/Fallacious Helper)	F/S	S/F
GPT 3.5	17.66%	10.5%
GPT 4	28%	0.83%

Table 2: Over three repetitions, the average number of claims where the persuader agent fails to persuade the debater with one helper but succeeds with the other (F denotes Failure and S denotes Success.).

We can conclude that the persuader’s increased persuasiveness is more significant due to fallacious arguments than the helper LLM agent.

4.5. Analysis of Fallacy Usage in Conversations

In a multi-round debate, various types of fallacies are used in each conversation. Each of these fallacies can influence the final outcome of the debate. For this analysis, we consider the final fallacy employed as the most influential for the final decision of agreement or disagreement. Figure 9 showcases the usage percentages of the top five fallacy types in conversations where the fallacious debater successfully altered the stance of the opposing debater.

4.6. Logical Fallacy Dataset

To the best of our knowledge, all available logical fallacy datasets (Jin et al., 2022; Habernal et al.,




Figure 8: Analyzing the susceptibility of GPT models to fallacious arguments. In the consistent agreement instances (“Three Success”), it shows a higher level of success rate for fallacious persuader compared to the logical persuaders for both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 debater agents. Furthermore, the number of instances in the bar chart groups for “One Success” and “Two Success” can be seen as indications of level of inconsistency in debater agent’s reasoning which is higher in GPT-3.5 compared to GPT-4.




Figure 9: Percentage distribution of the top five fallacies that influenced a debater’s opinion change in conversations for each model.

2018c; Sheng et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2019), contain a fallacious statement and their corresponding class tag. These datasets are not extracted from a prolonged multi-round debate over a topic. To address this limitation, we propose a dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical/fallacious arguments. Each pair is extracted from debates generated by LLMs on 100 controversial subjects during our experiment. We assign each pair their corresponding topic and question and confirm the fallacy class label using a different LLM.

5. Conclusion

This work investigates the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models. The proposed LOGICOM benchmark addresses two key questions: 1) Can large language models change their opinions through reasoning? and 2) Are large language models susceptible to fallacious reasoning? We demonstrate evidence of LLMs’ ability to alter their point of view through reasoning. Furthermore, we find that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are highly susceptible to fallacious reasoning. Finally, we propose

a new dataset that contains over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments extracted from multi-round debates.

6. Limitations & Discussion

Prompt engineering: While we craft a simple prompt for two main agents to minimize its impact on the debate path and maintain similarity to the default setting, different prompt constructions may impact the outcome.

LLM as persuader and helper agent: Since our primary objective is to evaluate the performance of the debater LLM agent, a potentially more efficient method would involve employing humans as the persuader and helper agents to minimize inaccuracies on the persuader’s end. We observe that the persuader LLM agent does not always employ the most compelling argument and lacks a comprehensive understanding of logical fallacies. We are of the opinion that employing either a human or a more precise persuader LLM would further demonstrate the debater LLM’s susceptibility to logical fallacies to a greater extent.

LLM as moderator agent: There are instances in which the master moderator agent terminates the debate earlier than expected or inaccurately reports the debater agent’s position on the claim.

Limited number of repetitions: Compared to other studies that assess the performance of LLMs, our multi-agent debate framework requires significantly more computational resources, which becomes costly for models like GPT-4. This constraint limits our ability to perform a more iterative evaluation of the model’s consistency on the same claim.

Limited number of LLMs tested: While there are several variations of LLMs available, we chose to evaluate the robustness of GPT models, as they are among the most important and well-known. Although we attempted to use this benchmark for

other models such as PaLM and LLaMA(Touvron et al., 2023), they either were unwilling to engage in arguments or were not equipped to discuss controversial topics. These characteristics of these models have directed our focus to GPT models.

7. Ethical Consideration

In this work, the potential impact of bias and misinformation is furthered by the use of logical fallacies which are trained to appeal to emotion and misrepresent facts in an effort to persuade the opponent. Such methods should be used with caution, especially when being employed on sensitive topics, as is the case in this work. In instances where such helpers are used in interactions with humans, such as interactions with customers in chat services, care should be taken to employ discriminator models, like (Zellers et al., 2019), to prevent harm.

Several instances of the use of GPT models have shown that it promotes racial and gender bias (Lucy and Bamman, 2021; Zack et al., 2023; Thakur, 2023). The increasing use of LLMs in human-computer interactions also presents the challenge of distinguishing truthful text from misinformation(Kalantari et al., 2021) when the text is generated or edited by an LLM (Schuster et al., 2020). To this end, developing robust defenses against bias and disinformation requires careful consideration to characterize the risks of these models. (Perez et al., 2022) developed LM-based red teaming for finding and fixing undesirable model behaviors. They found that offensive replies beget offensive replies, highlighting the importance of stopping offensive dialogues as early as possible. Perez et al. 2022 also showed, however, that some of the most powerful tools for improving LLM safety are LLMs themselves. For instance, (Zellers et al., 2019) developed a text generation model, Grover, which is used to generate fake news articles. Authors discovered that, counter-intuitively, the best defense against Grover is Grover itself, which sees 92% accuracy when used as a discriminator as opposed to a generator. For this reason, (Zellers et al., 2019) points out the importance of making such models public to ensure recourse against adversarial attacks.

8. Bibliographical References

Ning Bian, Xianpei Han, Le Sun, Hongyu Lin, Yaojie Lu, and Ben He. 2023. [Chatgpt is a knowledgeable but inexperienced solver: An investigation of commonsense problem in large language models](#).

Aakanksha Chowdhery, Sharan Narang, Jacob Devlin, Maarten Bosma, Gaurav Mishra, Adam Roberts, Paul Barham, Hyung Won Chung, Charles Sutton, Sebastian Gehrmann, Parker Schuh, Kensen Shi, Sasha Tsvyashchenko, Joshua Maynez, Abhishek Rao, Parker Barnes, Yi Tay, Noam Shazeer, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran, Emily Reif, Nan Du, Ben Hutchinson, Reiner Pope, James Bradbury, Jacob Austin, Michael Isard, Guy Gur-Ari, Pengcheng Yin, Toju Duke, Anselm Levskaya, Sanjay Ghemawat, Sunipa Dev, Henryk Michalewski, Xavier Garcia, Vedant Misra, Kevin Robinson, Liam Fedus, Denny Zhou, Daphne Ippolito, David Luan, Hyeontaek Lim, Barret Zoph, Alexander Spiridonov, Ryan Sepassi, David Dohan, Shivani Agrawal, Mark Omernick, Andrew M. Dai, Thanumalayan Sankaranarayanan Pillai, Marie Pellat, Aitor Lewkowycz, Erica Moreira, Rewon Child, Oleksandr Polozov, Katherine Lee, Zongwei Zhou, Xuezhi Wang, Brennan Saeta, Mark Diaz, Orhan Firat, Michele Catasta, Jason Wei, Kathy Meier-Hellstern, Douglas Eck, Jeff Dean, Slav Petrov, and Noah Fiedel. 2022. [Palm: Scaling language modeling with pathways](#).

Yilun Du, Shuang Li, Antonio Torralba, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Igor Mordatch. 2023. [Improving factuality and reasoning in language models through multiagent debate](#).

Yao Fu, Litu Ou, Mingyu Chen, Yuhao Wan, Hao Peng, and Tushar Khot. 2023a. [Chain-of-thought hub: A continuous effort to measure large language models' reasoning performance](#).

Yao Fu, Hao Peng, Tushar Khot, and Mirella Lapata. 2023b. [Improving language model negotiation with self-play and in-context learning from ai feedback](#).

Yao Fu, Hao Peng, Tushar Khot, and Mirella Lapata. 2023c. [Improving Language Model Negotiation with Self-Play and In-Context Learning from AI Feedback](#). ArXiv:2305.10142 [cs].

Ivan Habernal, Henning Wachsmuth, Iryna Gurevych, and Benno Stein. 2018a. [The argument reasoning comprehension task: Identification and reconstruction of implicit warrants](#). In *Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long Papers)*, pages 1930–1940, New Orleans, Louisiana. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Ivan Habernal, Henning Wachsmuth, Iryna Gurevych, and Benno Stein. 2018b. [The argument reasoning comprehension task: Identification and reconstruction of implicit warrants](#).

- In *Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long Papers)*. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Ivan Habernal, Henning Wachsmuth, Iryna Gurevych, and Benno Stein. 2018c. [Before name-calling: Dynamics and triggers of ad hominem fallacies in web argumentation](#). In *Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long Papers)*, pages 386–396, New Orleans, Louisiana. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Dan Hendrycks, Nicholas Carlini, John Schulman, and Jacob Steinhardt. 2022. [Unsolved problems in ml safety](#).
- Jie Huang and Kevin Chen-Chuan Chang. 2023. [Towards reasoning in large language models: A survey](#). In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2023*, pages 1049–1065, Toronto, Canada. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Shima Imani, Liang Du, and Harsh Shrivastava. 2023. [Mathprompter: Mathematical reasoning using large language models](#).
- Zhijing Jin, Abhinav Lalwani, Tejas Vaidhya, Xiaoyu Shen, Yiwen Ding, Zhiheng Lyu, Mrinmaya Sachan, Rada Mihalcea, and Bernhard Schoelkopf. 2022. [Logical fallacy detection](#). In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2022*, pages 7180–7198, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Nick Jung, Catarina Wranke, Klaus Hamburger, and Markus Knauff. 2014. [How emotions affect logical reasoning: evidence from experiments with mood-manipulated participants, spider phobics, and people with exam anxiety](#). *Frontiers in Psychology*, 5:570.
- Niloofer Kalantari, Duoduo Liao, and Vivian Genaro Motti. 2021. [Characterizing the online discourse in twitter: Users’ reaction to misinformation around covid-19 in twitter](#). In *2021 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data)*, pages 4371–4380.
- Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, and Yusuke Iwasawa. 2022. [Large language models are zero-shot reasoners](#). In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.
- Aitor Lewkowycz, Anders Andreassen, David Dohan, Ethan Dyer, Henryk Michalewski, Vinay Ramasesh, Ambrose Slone, Cem Anil, Imanol Schlag, Theo Gutman-Solo, Yuhuai Wu, Behnam Neyshabur, Guy Gur-Ari, and Vedant Misra. 2022. [Solving quantitative reasoning problems with language models](#).
- Stephanie Lin, Jacob Hilton, and Owain Evans. 2022. [Truthfulqa: Measuring how models mimic human falsehoods](#).
- Li Lucy and David Bamman. 2021. Gender and representation bias in gpt-3 generated stories. In *Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Narrative Understanding*, pages 48–55.
- Terezinha Nunes. 2012. [Logical Reasoning and Learning](#), pages 2066–2069. Springer US, Boston, MA.
- OpenAI. 2023a. [Better language models and their implications](#). Accessed: 2023-08-05.
- OpenAI. 2023b. [Gpt-4 technical report](#).
- Liangming Pan, Alon Albalak, Xinyi Wang, and William Yang Wang. 2023. [Logic-lm: Empowering large language models with symbolic solvers for faithful logical reasoning](#).
- Ethan Perez, Saffron Huang, Francis Song, Trevor Cai, Roman Ring, John Aslanides, Amelia Glaese, Nat McAleese, and Geoffrey Irving. 2022. Red teaming language models with language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.03286*.
- Swarnadeep Saha, Peter Hase, and Mohit Bansal. 2023. [Can language models teach weaker agents? teacher explanations improve students via theory of mind](#).
- Tal Schuster, Roei Schuster, Darsh J Shah, and Regina Barzilay. 2020. The limitations of stylometry for detecting machine-generated fake news. *Computational Linguistics*, 46(2):499–510.
- Emily Sheng, Kai-Wei Chang, Prem Natarajan, and Nanyun Peng. 2021. [“nice try, kiddo”: Investigating ad hominems in dialogue responses](#). In *Proceedings of the 2021 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies*, pages 750–767, Online. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Aarohi Srivastava, Abhinav Rastogi, Abhishek Rao, Abu Awal Md Shoeb, Abubakar Abid, Adam Fisch, Adam R Brown, Adam Santoro, Aditya Gupta, Adrià Garriga-Alonso, et al. 2022. Beyond the imitation game: Quantifying and extrapolating the capabilities of language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.04615*.

- Vishesh Thakur. 2023. Unveiling gender bias in terms of profession across llms: Analyzing and addressing sociological implications. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09162*.
- Christopher W. Tindale. 2007. *Fallacies and Argument Appraisal*. Critical Reasoning and Argumentation. Cambridge University Press.
- Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, Aurelien Rodriguez, Armand Joulin, Edouard Grave, and Guillaume Lample. 2023. [Llama: Open and efficient foundation language models](#).
- Karthik Valmeekam, Alberto Olmo, Sarath Sreedharan, and Subbarao Kambhampati. 2023. [Large language models still can't plan \(a benchmark for llms on planning and reasoning about change\)](#).
- Frans H Van Eemeren, Robert Grootendorst, and Rob Grootendorst. 2004. *A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Xuwei Wang, Weiyan Shi, Richard Kim, Yoojung Oh, Sijia Yang, Jingwen Zhang, and Zhou Yu. 2019. [Persuasion for good: Towards a personalized persuasive dialogue system for social good](#). In *Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, pages 5635–5649, Florence, Italy. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Taylor Webb, Keith J. Holyoak, and Hongjing Lu. 2023. [Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models](#). *Nature Human Behaviour*.
- Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, brian ichter, Fei Xia, Ed H. Chi, Quoc V Le, and Denny Zhou. 2022. [Chain of thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models](#). In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.
- Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Brian Ichter, Fei Xia, Ed Chi, Quoc Le, and Denny Zhou. 2023. [Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models](#).
- Fangzhi Xu, Qika Lin, Jiawei Han, Tianzhe Zhao, Jun Liu, and Erik Cambria. 2023a. [Are large language models really good logical reasoners? a comprehensive evaluation and beyond](#).
- Fangzhi Xu, Qika Lin, Jiawei Han, Tianzhe Zhao, Jun Liu, and Erik Cambria. 2023b. [Are large language models really good logical reasoners? a comprehensive evaluation and beyond](#).
- Travis Zack, Eric Lehman, Mirac Suzgun, Jorge A Rodriguez, Leo Anthony Celi, Judy Gichoya, Dan Jurafsky, Peter Szolovits, David W Bates, Raja-Elie E Abdunour, et al. 2023. Coding inequity: Assessing gpt-4's potential for perpetuating racial and gender biases in healthcare. *medRxiv*, pages 2023–07.
- Rowan Zellers, Ari Holtzman, Hannah Rashkin, Yonatan Bisk, Ali Farhadi, Franziska Roesner, and Yejin Choi. 2019. Defending against neural fake news. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 32.
- Wayne Xin Zhao, Kun Zhou, Junyi Li, Tianyi Tang, Xiaolei Wang, Yupeng Hou, Yingqian Min, Beichen Zhang, Junjie Zhang, Zican Dong, Yifan Du, Chen Yang, Yushuo Chen, Zhipeng Chen, Jinhao Jiang, Ruiyang Ren, Yifan Li, Xinyu Tang, Zikang Liu, Peiyu Liu, Jian-Yun Nie, and Ji-Rong Wen. 2023. [A survey of large language models](#).
- Denny Zhou, Nathanael Schärli, Le Hou, Jason Wei, Nathan Scales, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Claire Cui, Olivier Bousquet, Quoc V Le, and Ed H. Chi. 2023. [Least-to-most prompting enables complex reasoning in large language models](#). In *The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations*.